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Economic Perspective 2 
SCOTTISH STEEL AT THE CROSSROADS 
Jim Love and Jim Stevens 
Fraser of Allander Institute and Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
The 1980s have seen a continuation of the 
e ros ion of s t ee l -mak ing capac i ty in 
Scot land. Closures a t Clydebridge, 
Craigneuk, Glengarnock and now Gartcosh 
have reduced not only the number of plants 
but also the d ivers i ty of the product 
base. Concern over the implications of 
the closure of Gartcosh, controversy over 
the SDA's advice to the Scot t ish Office, 
redundancies at Clydesale and fears about 
the plate operation at Dalzell have again 
concentrated a t ten t ion on the future of 
the s tee l industry in Scotland. The 
purpose of this Perspective i s to analyse 
the nature of the threa t to the Scottish 
s tee l industry and se t out the issues of 
relevance to BSC's 1988 review of i t s 
operations. 
In the 1988 review BSC w i l l seek to 
es tabl i sh that configuration of plants 
which is consistent with both external and 
d o m e s t i c t r a d i n g c o n s t r a i n t s . 
E x t e r n a l l y , the p r i n c i p a l , d i r e c t 
determinant of market conditions for BSC 
is the regulatory framework imposed by the 
EEC. The EEC view in te rna t iona l markets 
as being c h a r a c t e r i s e d by chronic 
overcapacity and strong pro tec t ion is t 
sentiment. Most OECD countries are net 
exporters of s tee l to th i rd countr ies . 
However, d e s p i t e the emergence of a 
buyers' market many LDC's and Soc ia l i s t 
States continue to expand s tee l capacity 
and subsidise production for strategic and 
development reasons. In addition there 
are adverse trends in European s tee l 
consumption resulting in part from policy-
induced fal ls in public sector investment, 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of o ther m a t e r i a l s and 
l i gh te r more compact product designs. 
Thus European s t e e l producers face 
relatively stagnant home markets, limited 
access to US customers and intensely 
competitive and declining th i rd markets 
where good margin business i s difficult to 
generate in the face of low cost Japanese 
and Korean exports. 
Such considerations prompted the EEC to 
in t roduce the Davignon Plan in 1980. 
Reinforced by the system of negotiated 
import r e s t r a i n t s with third countries 
in t roduced in 1978, the under lying 
objectives of the Davignon Plan were those 
of achieving commercial viability free of 
s t a t e a ids and of secur ing capac i ty 
reductions in the EEC such that by the end 
of 1985 EEC supply and demand should have 
been brought into l ine . To eliminate 
excess supply and to f a c i l i t a t e the 
necessary restructuring the Plan provided 
a system of production quotas and a system 
of subsidies. The Davignon Plan failed to 
a t t a i n i t s o b j e c t i v e s and has been 
continued in modified form. Fur ther 
s u b s t a n t i a l capac i ty r educ t ions are 
requi red to achieve balance in the 
Community by 1990 although steel producers 
are currently in be t te r technical and 
financial shape than in the early 1980's. 
Domestically, the UK Government requires 
that BSC makes the industry commerciably 
viable and tha t i t prepares the industry 
for an as yet , unspecified pr iva t i sa t ion 
exercise. I t i s pre-occupation with this 
requirement which now dominates strategic 
thinking within the Corporation. 
BSC's strategy for the period to 988 has 
been examined by the EEC in l a t e 1985 and 
that examination led to two important 
conclusions. F i r s t , the Commission 
confirmed tha t the s t rategy, involving 
retent ion of the present five integrated 
p l a n t s inc lud ing Ravenscraig, should 
permit achievement of v i ab i l i ty in the 
three years to 1988. Secondly, the 
Commission agreed t h a t t h e BSC 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g p l ans , involving the 
acquisition and closure of the Alphasteel 
str ip mill and the closure of a number of 
plants including the Gartcosh cold-rolling 
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mil l , were e l ig ib le under Community law 
for s t a t e aid before the removal of 
el igibi l i ty at the end of 1985. This aid 
to BSC, as was announced in December 1985, 
amounted to £539m. 
Much i s made in of f ic ia l c i r c l e s of the 
EEC conclusion that BSC wil l achieve 
viability by 1988 with a l l five integrated 
s i t e s . This conclusion cannot be 
dep loyed , however , t o s u g g e s t a 
n e c e s s a r i l y more secure fu tu re for 
Ravenscraig. In the period to 1988 
Ravenscraig's output i s required while 
upgrading and refurbishment takes place in 
other plants . The central element in 
terms of any suggest ion t h a t BSC's 
commercial standing wi l l support the 
retention of Ravenscraig thereafter i s the 
definition of "viabi l i ty" . 
This question of definition emerged in the 
23 January Parliamentaty debate on the 
closure of Gartcosh and highlighted the 
exacting influence of the pr iva t i sa t ion 
objective. The new Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Mr Malcolm Rifkind, ci ted the 
Commission's report as saying that BSC 
"would reach v iab i l i ty in 1987/88 by 
meeting the Commission's ta rge t profi t" 
(Hansard, 23 January, 1986, p.479), but he 
provided no definition of "target profit". 
Subsequently, Dr Jeremy Bray (Motherwell, 
South; pointed out that: 
"The BSC has adopted a milestone on 
the "road to viabi l i ty" . . . . The 
corporation ca l l s i t "financial 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y " , t h a t i s , 
s u f f i c i e n t p r o f i t s t o cover 
interest costs, capital expenditure 
roughly equivalent to depreciation, 
and increases in working cap i t a l , 
but giving no return on equity". 
(Hansard, 23 January 1986, p.499) 
The absence of any r e tu rn on equi ty 
emphasises t h a t t h i s can only be an 
in t e r im t a r g e t in the face of the 
Government's determination to pr ivat i se 
the industry, a point pursued, inter alia, 
by Dr Bray and also by Mr Kenneth Warren 
(Hastings and Rye) Chairman of the Trade 
and Industry Select Committee. Mr Warren 
favours p r i v a t i s a t i o n but ques t ions 
whether organisations such as Ravenscraig 
could every achieve the requirements for 
privatisation thought to have been imposed 
on BSC by the Government. According to Mr 
Warren: 
"My understanding to about a f i rs t 
order of accuracy, i s that the 
Government are looking for a profit 
of £300 million on £4 billion worth 
of sales. That sounds pretty good. 
I hope that BSC can achieve i t . If 
i t can, i t w i l l achieve something 
that i t s prime competitors in other 
parts of the world, l ike Nippon-
Kolkan, Nippon-Steel and Thyssen 
are simply not able to achieve. 
Those competitors are turning over 
prof i t s that are about a half or a 
third of those that the Government 
expect BSC to make if i t i s to be a 
saleable commodity". (Hansard, 23 
January 1986, p.490) 
I t i s then reasonable to conclude that the 
c o n j u n c t u r e of the h e i g h t of the 
Government ' s p r o f i t h u r d l e f o r 
pr iva t i sa t ion and BSC's declared position 
that the v i a b i l i t y and p r i v a t i s a t i o n 
objectives cannot be met with three strip 
mills points ineluctably to Ravencraig's 
closure. 
Whatever the defini t ion of "viabi l i ty" 
applied to BSC's operations within the UK, 
the EEC now requires that steel-making 
a c t i v i t i e s be free of cer tain types of 
s ta te aid. Having failed to meet the 
original Davignon objectives, the EEC now 
seeks to effect a t rans i t ion to a less 
closely regulated market. After 1986 the 
EEC wi l l sanction aid only for specific 
purposes such as research and development, 
environmental improvement and redundancy 
payments associated with plant closure. 
Operating subsidies are eliminated as are 
a i d s for o t h e r t y p e s of c a p i t a l 
expenditure. These measures have the 
e f fec t of ensuring t h a t the p r o f i t s 
necessary to pr ivat i se the UK industry 
have to be generated internally. 
I t i s , however, important to recognise 
t h a t whi le opera t ing subs id i e s are 
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removed, indirect s t a t e subsidies remain 
permissible. These indi rec t subsidies 
affect costs over a range of inputs to 
s t e e l - m a k i n g i n c l u d i n g : e n e r g y ; 
t ranspor t ; continuing employee benefi ts 
such as pens ions , hea l th and income 
subsidies; labour costs such as retraining 
and relocation, taxes; and rates. 
A recen t study commissioned by the 
Nat ional Economic Development Office 
(NEDO) and conducted by Environmental 
Resources Limited sheds considerable light 
on the extent of these indirect subsidies 
in four European c o u n t r i e s , France, 
Germany, I t a ly and the UK, and across a 
range of manufac tu r ing a c t i v i t i e s 
including steel-making. After examining 
the main ind i rec t s t a t e a ids , the NEDO 
study concluded that three categories are 
of par t i cu la r importance in the s teel 
industry: namely, aids to t ransport , 
continuing employee benefi ts and labour 
cos ts . Excluded from consideration, 
however, were i n d i r e c t s u b s i d i e s to 
energy. This exclusion i s s igni f icant , 
given the widespread susp ic ion t h a t 
European Governments provide subsidies for 
electricity and, particularly in the case 
of Italy, for coking coal. 
The question of energy subsidies has been 
brought to Government's a t t e n t i o n on 
numerous occas ions . In 1984, BSC 
Chairman Robert Haslam told the trade and 
Industry Select Committee: 
"Elec t r ic i ty prices are important 
and if you re f l ec t on the best 
comparisons we can make, and these 
are not by any means f a l l i b l e , the 
German pr ices and the pr ices in 
Holland are probably 5% to 10% 
lower than ours. These comparable 
prices move with exchange rates a l l 
the t ime and f i g u r e s r e f l e c t 
current rates. In France i t will 
be 20% lower than ou r s . In 
Germany you may have par t i cu la r 
s i tua t ions which may enjoy even 
greater benefits." (Cmnd 344 p340) 
He added: 
"Energy in Germany i s for major 
s tee l plants considerably cheaper 
because beneficial prices can be 
focussed there . This would not 
happen in t h i s country because of 
our ant i -d iscr iminat ion culture." 
(Cmnd 344 p3T6) 
There i s l i t t l e to suggest that t h i s 
s i tua t ion has improved material ly . I t 
should be noted that current exchange 
rates are similar to those prevailing when 
Sir Robert Haslam gave t h i s evidence and 
that BSC executives have underlined these 
po in t s on severa l occas ions in the 
i n t e rven ing per iod. In 1984, the 
Government did not accept t h i s analysis . 
The DTI responded by admitting tha t some 
Continental steelmakers enjoy electricity 
charges up to 15? lower than those facing 
BSC. However, they would not concede 
that "the generality of steelworks on the 
continent are paying less than BSCCCmnd 
344 _ Further Memorandum submitted by the 
Department of Trade and Industry). 
Table 1 State aid to the steel Industry 
France Germany Italy UK 
Total aid 130.7 244.3 123.0 14.4 
Reductions of 
steel costs £/ 
tonne of steel 8.3 8.0 6.0 1.2 
Costs reductions 
£/tonne of 
s teel BOP 7-03 6.78 6.05 0.63 
Source: NEDO, Indirect Aids in the EEC 
and their Impact on the EEC Steel 
Industry, Environmental Resources 
Limited, Economics and Policy 
Unit, September 1985. 
The main findings of the recent NEDO 
r e p o r t are summarised in Table 1. 
Several observations can readily be made 
on these findings. F i r s t , in absolute 
terms the to t a l aid given to the UK s tee l 
industry f a l l s very far short of tha t 
given in the o ther th ree c o u n t r i e s . 
Given d i f f e r ences in output l e v e l s , 
however, i t i s necessary to consider not 
the absolute value of aid but rather the 
impact on cost reduction per tonne of 
steel output. This reduces the scale of 
the disadvantage apparently experienced by 
the UK industry. Nevertheless, the cost 
reduction in the UK i s only one-fifth of 
tha t enjoyed in I ta ly and almost one-
seventh of that enjoyed in France. More 
interestingly with respect to Ravenscraig, 
the NEDO study also considered the cost 
reductions to bas i c oxygen producers 
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(BOP). Here the UK cost reduction i s 
only between almost one-tenth and one-
e leventh of t h a t in the t h r ee o ther 
countries. Generally, therefore, s teel-
makers in other countries benefit from 
indirect to a greater extent than in the 
UK. 
The relatively low level of UK subsidy to 
the steel industry is consistent with the 
Government's free-market philosophy. 
Undoubtedly, however, while the EEC i s 
moving to a free market, that market i s 
not a free market. Domestic UK policy 
places BSC at a cost disadvantage of £5 to 
£8 per tonne even without account being 
t aken of s u b s i d i e s to e n e r g y , a 
p o t e n t i a l l y damaging margin as EEC 
producers seek to increase their market 
shares in the l ibera l i sed market of the 
late 1980s. Unfortunately the Commission 
have a curious outlook on such matters. 
In 1984, Viscount Davingnon told the Trade 
and Industry Select Committee that: 
"The Commission do not take account 
of i n d i r e c t s u b s i d i e s , p a r t l y 
because i t i s too complicated, but 
basicallybecause the Commission do 
not t h i n k t h a t they c r e a t e 
d i s t o r t i o n s w h i c h w i l l 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e 
competitiveness of firms." 
(Cmnd 344 - Note of the Meeting of 
the Committee wi th 
Viscount Davingnon) 
Two comments are opposite. First, as of 
November 1985 the EEC s t i l l adhered to 
t h i s view. Secondly, the pub l i c ly 
available evidence on both energy and 
other c o s t s i n d i c a t e s t h a t the EEC 
position i s a t odds with rea l i ty and i s 
potent ial ly damaging to the Ravenscraig 
complex. 
In 1984, the BSC Chairman Sir Robert 
Haslam discussed the c losure of an 
integrated plant in very frank terms by 
indicating to the Trade and Industry 
Select Committee that: "Our view would be 
that any closure would be phased and hence 
an immediate closure would be unlikely". 
(Cmnd 344 p57). 
The closure of Gartcosh may be seen as one 
of these phases. As argued in previous 
Commentaries, a number of now wel l -
rehearsed factors continue to point to 
Ravenscraig's closure. F i r s t , BSC has 
persistently argued that the objectives of 
commercial viability and privatisation are 
inconsistent with a 5 plant configuration. 
Unfair compet i t ion from i n d i r e c t l y 
subs id ised European compet i to rs and 
continuing adverse market trends reinforce 
this conclusion. Secondly, the purchase 
and s u b s t a n t i a l r e f u r b i s h m e n t of 
Alphasteel's continuous casting faci l i t ies 
for eventual installation at Llanwern will 
remove Ravenscra ig ' s t echno log ica l 
advantage in the production of high 
quality s t r i p products. This renders 
Ravenscraig more vulnerable to BSC's long-
standing desire for closure on locational 
grounds. The locational savings derived 
from the Gartcosh closure were minimal 
which suggests that the bulk of such 
economies are s t i l l to be r e a l i s e d . 
Thirdly, the Shotton linkage i s not a 
source of long-term security given BSC's 
well-s tated position that they can and 
must load a l l of their rolling mills from 
four plants . At present BSC require 
Ravenscraig's concast product in order to 
faci l i tate their drive to increase market 
penetration in the coated s t r i p sector. 
By 1988 th i s necessity wil l disappear as 
the enhanced f a c i l i t i e s of Llanwern come 
on stream. In addition, BSC now openly 
admit that there i s an option of supplying 
Shotton from the Lackenby Complex on 
Teeside. Thus, by the end of the decade 
BSC could easily do without Ravenscraig's 
strip output. Fourthly, the decision to 
undertake no investment in coke ovens at 
any UK works will bite f i rs t at Motherwell 
because of the relative age of the capital 
stock. This wi l l force BSC to purchase 
scarce and expensive coke at the beginning 
of the next decade which a l l ied to the 
adverse effects on the plants energy 
balance, wi l l ra ise Ravenscraig's costs . 
Given the need to generate investment 
capi tal in ternal ly and the backlog of 
process innovations available to BSC, i t 
i s not d i f f i c u l t to f o r e s e e the 
Corporation seeking closure to avoid the 
commitment of funds to i t s perceived 
marginal unit . Fif thly, Ravenscraig i s 
vulnerable to any misfortune in any sector 
of BSC's bulk steelmaking activity. The 
s t r i p division has recently undertaken a 
major policy review which culminated in 
increased investment and employment in 
Wales and the closure of Gartcosh. 
As indicated above, Ravenscraig's s t r i p 
operation looks extremely marginal and 
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vulnerable to any deter iora t ion in BSC's 
share of home markets or f a i l u r e to 
maintain export volume. Unfortunately, 
the new f lexible quota system makes i t 
p o s s i b l e for North European s t r i p 
producers to cap i t a l i s e on BSC's planned 
temporary reduction in supply of concast 
cold reduced non-coated products. In 
a d d i t i o n , however, Ravenscraig i s 
t h r e a t e n e d in t h e medium-term by 
uncertainty over the future of the Dalzell 
p la te mi l l . Although situated adjacent 
to Ravenscraig, Dalzell i s not part of 
t h a t i n t e g r a t e d c o m p l e x . In 
organisational terms, Ravenscraig is part 
of BSC's S t r ip Division while Dalzell i s 
part of BSC's General Steels Division. 
Ravenscraig supplies Dalzell with input in 
the form of concast slabs and a small 
proportion of conventionally cast ingots. 
Since the closure of the Hartlepool plate 
mill in 1984, BSC i s l e f t with only two 
pla te mi l l s , a t Dalzell and Scunthorpe. 
Both mills are small in capacity terms by 
European and Japanese standards and cannot 
produce wider speci f ica t ions . Indeed, 
these mi l l s were developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s to serve the sh ipbu i ld ing 
i n d u s t r y , a market which has shrunk 
dramatically in recent years. Whilst 
clearly the better of the two BSC plants, 
Dalzell i s underpowered and poorly la id 
out which results in output being only 50% 
of that of European mi l l s of s imilar 
design and vintage. However, owing to 
Ravenscraig's high qual i ty steelmaking 
fac i l i t ies and an innovative, but costly, 
alloying process, BSC i s able to compete 
with more modern and sui tably furbished 
plate mi l l s in the exacting spec ia l i s t 
plate, defence and oil-related markets. 
Market projections for plate are not good. 
The EEC estimates that substantial excess 
capacity of 4.7 mill ion tonnes (33.3%) 
exists and suggests that further capacity 
reductions are urgently required by 1990. 
A high proportion of Dalzell's output goes 
to the local offshore construction sector. 
However, the prospects for North Sea 
exploration and development are uncertain. 
Until recently industry analysts were 
projecting a mini boom in ac t iv i ty over 
the next three years, but developments in 
world oil markets have promoted increasing 
pessimism and several fabricators, such as 
Trafalgar House, have recently scaled down 
their estimates of future orders. 
Were BSC to invest in a modern plate mill, 
e i t h e r one or both of t h e i r p resen t 
operations would have to close because a 
p la te mil l b u i l t to modern standards and 
design would be able, in a l l probability, 
to handle BSC's l i k e l y share of t h i s 
market. Consequently, Dalzell , and, 
indeed, the Scunthorpe mill are vulnerable 
in a strategic sense to BSC's necessity to 
modernise i t s infrastructure. 
From a Scottish perspective, i t i s ominous 
that BSC executives have referred to the 
plant as "an ageing pla temil l" and have 
refused to sanction any major investment 
at the Motherwell s i te . More worrying are 
r ecen t r e p o r t s t h a t General S t e e l ' s 
executives are preparing a case for the 
i n s t a l l a t i on of secondary steelmaking 
f a c i l i t i e s a t bo th Lackenby and 
Scunthorpe. At present such f a c i l i t i e s 
provide Ravenscraig-Dalzell with unique 
access to BSC's spec ia l i s t defence and 
o i l - r e l a t e d markets . In a d d i t i o n , 
General Steels are currently reviewing the 
plate-making operation and are believed to 
have isolated 3 options involving a new 
mill at either of the present locations or 
a t a s i t e in the North East. I t would 
appear that BSC may be clearing the ground 
to eliminate their dependence on Dalzell 
for quali ty pla te production. Dalzell 
currently accounts for around 20% of 
Ravenscraig's output and loss of that 
customer would g r e a t l y e x a c e r b a t e 
R a v e n s c r a i g ' s p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n . 
Decisions on plate production would seem a 
legi t imate concern for Government given 
that a plate closure would jeopardise the 
present five plant strategy. 
In the January debate in the House of 
Commons the Secretary of State commented 
that "without any qual i f icat ion "I 
attach great importance to Ravenscraig and 
to the v iab i l i ty of the Scott ish s tee l 
industry" and continued "I believe that 
the Corporation can achieve viability with 
the continuation of a l l i t s five plants". 
(Hansard, 23 January 1986, p482). Given 
present and likely circumstances, however, 
there are grounds for considerable concern 
and the task of retaining Ravenscraig 
af ter 1988 looks at l e a s t as formidable 
for Mr Rifkind as i t was for Mr Younger in 
1982. 
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